Corporate Tax And Financing Decisions: An Emerging Market Experience by Okoyeuzu, Chinwe Regina
ŒCONOMICA 
 
 5 
Business Administration and Business Economics 
 
Corporate Tax And Financing  
Decisions: An Emerging Market Experience 
 
Chinwe, R. Okoyeuzu
1 
 
Abstract: The objective of this study is to determine the significance of the tax 
benefits in explaining observed leverage ratios amongst firms in Nigeria. To 
investigate how the results of previous studies and traditional theories on financial 
leverage compare with the real situation in the Nigeria corporate environment. The 
differential impact of tax treatment of debt on corporate financial policy in 
developed countries. The parameters of debt ratios are estimated by fitting multiple 
linear regression after this equation- l=f (τ  r, s, v, π, m, c, σ). Our dataset covers a 
cross-section of 60 quoted firms from Nigerian stock Markets over a ten year 
period (1996-2005). The tax benefit of debt approximately equals fifteen (15) 
percent of firm value. However, this tax advantage does not seem to explain 
observed debt ratios since we could not obtain a statistically significant coefficient 
for the marginal tax rate. The provision of empirical evidence in support of known 
theories. 
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JEL Classification: G12; G32 
 
1 Introduction  
The finance literature has long offered a simple model of how taxes affect 
financing decisions .The capital structure choice has long been an issue of great 
interest in the corporate finance literature. This interest is due to the fact that the 
mix of funds (leverage ratio) affects the cost and availability of capital and thus, 
firms’ investment Tax shelters have received recent scrutiny in the financial 
economics literature because of their impact on firm decisions. Since the seminal 
capital structure irrelevancy proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1958), research 
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and debate on capital structure have been intense but somewhat inconclusive .Tax 
shelters have brought to the fore the pervasive use of shelters and the many 
millions of dollars of profits that appear to have been sheltered. Accounting for 
debt tax shields and financial distress costs overturns the capital structure 
irrelevancy proposition and leads to an optimal gearing ratio which maximizes firm 
value (Kim 1978). A change in the corporate tax level can have a significant 
impact on rate making and capital structure for   companies. Financial economists 
recognize the importance of understanding the role and impact of tax shelters on 
financial decisions, and have recently initiated efforts to understand such 
transactions. Tax constitutes a potentially important consideration in firms’ 
decisions. If a company is financed by debt capital, there will be tax relief available 
on interest payments. 
Alternatively, if the company is financed with share holders’ fund (that is equity 
capital), then dividend will be paid on the equity from the profit after tax, which 
will in turn give rise to a liability for personal income tax.  In the presence of taxes, 
however, companies would generally favour debt, since the tax shield by 
deductible interest expenses increases the company value .Over the years, 
researchers have examined the differential impact of tax treatment of debt on 
corporate financial policy in developed countries .However the existing studies in 
this area are scanty in Nigeria. This is the lacuna this study attempts to fill. Studies 
on the incidence of company income tax and its impact on financing decisions of 
firms have concentrated on developed countries.  
In Nigeria, corporate interests’ payments are deductible before tax; 30% of 
corporate tax savings on interest deductions can lower the cost of debt to 70%. The 
rest of this paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we briefly review the relevant 
capital structure literature. The dataset employed and methodology is discussed in 
section 3. The results are presented in section 4 while section 5 summaries the 
salient findings and concludes. 
 
2. Capital Structure Theory and Evidence 
Capital structure can be defined as the mixture of long-term financing sources such 
as debt, preference shares and equity interests which constitute the permanent 
capital used to finance an organization. It is simply the makeup of the permanent 
capital of the firm. Capital on the other hand is the amounts of wealth placed at the 
disposal of the firm to enable it carry out its functions. 
A comprehensive summary of the capital structure literature is provided by such 
authors as Harris and Raviv (1991) and Frank and Goyal (2005). Central to our 
understanding of financing behavior is the trade-off theory which asserts that an 
optimal gearing ratio is reached by the firm at the point where the marginal benefits 
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of employing debt, such as interest tax shields, equal its marginal costs such as 
financial distress and bankruptcy costs (Kim, 1978). 
The empirical case for the trade-off theory is not as strong as it looks. First, 
statistical results “consistent” with the trade off theory can be consistent with other 
theories as well. Second, there are too many examples of successful, highly 
profitable firms operating at low debt ratios. These firms are not “the exceptions 
that prove the rule; because studies of the determinants of actual debt ratios 
consistently find that the most profitable companies in a given industry tend to 
borrow the least. For example, Wald (1999) found that profitability was “the single 
largest determinant of debt/asset ratios” in cross-sectional tests for the U.S, U.K; 
Germany, France and Japan. Booth, et al. (2001) reached a similar conclusion for a 
sample of ten developing countries. High profits mean low debt, and vice versa. 
But if managers can exploit valuable interest tax shields, as the trade off theory 
predicts, we should observe exactly the opposite relationship. High profitability 
means that the firm can service more debt without risking financial distress. Debt is 
a contract that forces the firm to pay out cash. A high debt ratio can be dangerous, 
but it can also add value by putting the firm on a diet and curbing overinvestment. 
Stulz (1990) presents a model of how the diet works. He assumes that managers 
will always invest free cash flow; even in negative- NPO projects, unless the cash 
is required for debt services. The ideal level of debt (and debt service) leaves just 
enough cash to fund all-and only-positive-NPO projects. Thus leverage should 
depend on the investment opportunity set. Firms with valuable growth 
opportunities should choose low debt ratios to free up cash for expansion. Firms 
with limited growth opportunities should operate at high debt ratios to constrain 
management. Debt plays a similar role in leveraged restructurings, where a public 
firm all at once borrows a large fraction of the value of its assets and pays out the 
proceeds to stock holders. Wruck (1995) provided a fascinating case study of the 
leveraged restructuring at sealed Air Corporation. Lemmon and Zender separate 
firms into two groups on the forgone tax benefits associated with debt financing. 
They documented that a large fraction of firms are conservatively financed, and 
that neither the pecking order nor the trade off theory of capital structure 
adequately explain this result. In their corrected version of the classics MM’S 
propositions, Modigliani and Miller (1963). Show that when corporate tax is taken 
into consideration, the firm value becomes an increasing function of debt. Debt 
financing is viewed as more advantageous than equity because using more debt 
reduces the expected tax liability and increases the after tax cash flow. This result 
also implies that, giving the existence of bankruptcy costs or reorganization section 
costs due to debt usage, there should be an optimal capital structure that equates 
debt tax shields and the cost of financial distress. The analysis in Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) considers the impact of corporate tax while ignoring the effect of 
personal income tax. Miller (1997) explicitly takes into account the effect of the 
latter tax code and demonstrate  that in equilibrium, the total amount of tax saving 
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will be equal to zero. In other words, the advantage of the corporate tax is 
cancelled by the disadvantage of the personal tax. The author further suggests that 
there should be no optimal debt ratio for any individual firms. 
 
Determinants of Capital Structure 
This section describes firm characteristics that existing theories of capital structure 
suggest may be related to the debt-equity choice made by firms. Our primary 
variables of interest is the tax benefits  debt of quoted firms. In addition, we control 
for size, profitability, growth, collateral value of assets, non-debt tax shields. 
A. Tax Benefits Variables. 
Extrapolating from the argument in DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) that there exists 
a negative relation between leverage and the level of non-debt tax. In addition to 
the above factors, the effective tax rate has been used as a possible determinant of 
the capital structure choice. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958),as interest 
payments on debt are tax-deductible, firms with enough taxable income have an 
incentive to issue more debt. It must also be pointed out that higher corporate tax 
rates reduce firms’ internal funds and increase their cost of capital. In other words, 
higher taxes might decrease the formation of fixed capital and demand for external 
funds (Kremp et al., 1999). Based on this between arguments, we expect a negative 
relationship in the level of debt and the effective tax rate 
B. Profitability 
Due to the tax deductibility of interest payments, it is argued that highly profitable 
companies tend to have high levels of debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). 
However, The pecking order theory of Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), 
and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) suggests that firms prefer to finance 
investments first from retained earnings, second from debt, and third from equity. 
According to this theory, more profitable firms should have lower leverage ratios 
than less profitable firms since they are able to finance their investment 
opportunities with retained earnings.  
C. Firm Size 
Previous literature suggests that leverage ratios may be related to firm size. Warner 
(1977) and Ang, Chua, and McConnell (1982) provide evidence that direct 
bankruptcy costs increase as firm size decreases. Further, larger firms tend to be 
more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy. These observations suggest that 
large firms should be more levered than small firms. However, size can also proxy 
for asymmetric information and access to capital markets. Because of these two 
factors, Smith (1977) shows that issuing equity is more expensive for small firms 
than for large firms, suggesting that small firms may be more levered than large 
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firms. In addition, it is argued that smaller firms tend to have less long-term debt 
because of shareholder – lender conflict 
D. Non-Debt Tax Shields from Operations 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest that tax deductions for depreciation and tax-
loss carry forwards are substitutes for debt, and thus firms with large non-debt tax 
shield should have less debt. 
E. Growth 
Myers (1977) argued that due to information asymmetries, companies with high 
leverage ratios might have the tendency to undertake activities contrary to the 
interests of debt holders (under-invest in economically profitable projects).If firms 
with high growth opportunities have high information asymmetry, then we would 
expect these firms to have less debt. In addition, as suggested by Titman and 
Wessels (1988), if growth opportunities are viewed as capital assets that do not 
generate current taxable income, one would expect a negative relation between 
growth Opportunities and leverage .Finally, as suggested by Galai and Masulis 
(1976),Jensen and meckling (1976),and if stockholders have the incentive to 
expropriate wealth from bondholders by investing in a suboptimal fashion and the 
cost associated with this agency problem is higher for firms with high growth 
opportunities, then again, one would expect leverage to be negatively related to 
growth opportunities 
F. Collateral value of Assets. 
Myers and Majluf(1984) argue that if a firm’s managers have better information 
about a security than outside shareholders, then there may be costs associated with 
issuing such securities. Since issuing debt that is secured by assets whose values 
are known would avoid these costs, firms with more collateral would tend to issue 
more debt. The agency arguments in the previous section, that suggest a negative 
relation between growth opportunities and leverage, would also imply a positive 
relation between collateralization and leverage. Firms with higher collateral assets 
should be able to take o more debt than other firms since there is less information 
asymmetry involved in these assets. 
 
3. Methodology 
To derive a proxy for the tax benefits of debt in the Nigerian corporate 
environment, we use TcB. Tc represents the corporate tax rate while B represents 
average debt issues for the selected firms and for the ten year period. Marginal 
corporate tax rate is measured as follows: 
ح = 
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This definition is consistent with (Homaifar, et. al. 1994:11). The basic model for 
establishing the nature and extent of relationship between the leverage ratio (į) and 
firm’s attributes identifies eight exogenous variables. these variable are the 
corporate tax rate (ح), the non-debt tax shelter ratio (r), firm size (s), future growth 
opportunities (v), profitability (), capital market conditions (m), tangible assets (c) 
and earning volatility (σ).   
The parameters of debt ratios are- estimated by fitting multiple linear regression 
after this equation- l=f (τ r, s, v, π, m, c, σ).  
The expected sign is that firms’ leverage is an increasing function of their 
respective tax positions. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 4.1. Average market values of Outstanding Debt and Net Assets of Sample 
Firms (1996 – 2005) 
s/n Name of company Average 
outstanding 
debt (i)(N’b) 
Net assets 
(NAi)(N’b) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Dunlop  
R.T. Briscoe 
Guinness 
Nigerian Breweries 
Ashaka Cement 
WAPCO  
First Bank (FBN) 
UBA Plc 
Union Bank (UBN) 
CAP Plc 
John Holt 
Unilever  
PZ Industries  
UAC 
7-UP Bottling Company 
Cadbury 
Flour Mills 
Nigerian Bottling Company 
May and Baker  
Neimeth  
Vita Foam 
Mobil 
1, 231,032 
845,763 
2,019,007 
10,241,765 
2,664 
10,659,102 
160,646,842 
105,065,122 
169,523,200 
244,895 
1,748,200 
1,750,364 
1,021,851 
4,244,709 
1,397,129 
2,740,938 
5,565,057 
2,603,398 
230,862 
476,971 
364,256 
2,850,103 
3,470,421 
1,514,570 
46,826,773 
126,111,065 
13,753,664 
34,470,938 
207,084,034 
120,951,322 
220,222,800 
905,555 
3,297,000 
33,273,409 
18,931,344 
10,640,361 
4,876,588 
27,084,404 
13,911,759 
36,685,639 
810,816 
967,944 
1,854,545 
29,268,428 
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23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Oando 
Total Plc 
Longman 
Nestle 
Texaco 
Berger Paints 
CFAO  
First Aluminum  
Julius Berger 
Trans Nationwide Express 
Nigerian Enamel Ware 
Lennards Nigeria 
Vono Products 
Academy Press 
Cement Co. of N/Nigeria  
Poly Products Nigeria 
SCOA Nigeria 
Triple Gee 
AVON 
CAPPA AND D’ALBERTO  
Northern Nig. Flour Mills 
International Breweries 
Alumaco Plc 
Nigerian Wires and Cable 
Nigerian German Chemical Plc  
Glaxosmithcline Consumer 
Okumo Oil 
Afriprint 
United Textile 
Evans Medical 
Morison 
IPWA 
Capital Oil Plc 
Thomas Wyatt Plc 
NCR 
Presco 
Costain 
B.O.C. Gases  
8,619,471 
232,842 
119,565 
159,646,835 
104,765,124 
1,335,030 
741,763 
302,640 
169,222,834 
444,899 
1,758,602 
1,550,360 
1,611,853 
4,234,307 
10,049,100 
9,881,765 
2,219,057 
433,963 
464,236 
1,297,129 
5,265,007 
2,640,738 
2,703,598 
2,650 
432,871 
576,942 
8,419,451 
319,585 
464,276 
10,376,951 
9,252,939 
10,659,502 
232,842 
10,119,165 
10,244,895 
2,845,662 
38,220,488 
105,065,122 
27,793,913 
27,282,966 
489,430 
207,084,034 
120,951,322 
3,670,451 
1,714,177 
14,955,600 
219,020,864 
937,509 
4,295,050 
32,271,309 
18,903,440 
11,540,341 
33,570,958 
124,100,060 
48,837,778 
810,816 
1,754,044 
4,977,086 
15,901,750 
27,063,400 
34,695,648 
29,268,428 
27,482,966 
988,948 
27,993,943 
489,137 
1,954,551 
31,967,944 
25,710,810 
32,297,000 
26,482,966 
21,489,137 
26,905,585 
9,514,570 
109,877,881 
118,951,322 
TOTAL 1,186,668,259 2,430,910,613 
Source: Computed from Handpicked Data from the Annual Reports and Accounts of 60 
Sampled Quoted Firms for Various Years. 
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Average outstanding debt is the aggregate data of each firm for the period under 
study(1996-2005).Debt for purpose of  this study  includes all borrowings or credit 
arrangement for  which the firm (beneficiary) incurs periodic charges such as 
interest, rent, discount, commissions etc that are expensed over the periods to 
which they relate and are thereby tax-deductibles. The choice of total debt (long 
and short term) is best in countries where accounting data are not uniformly 
available. This is against the practice in some other countries where some 
researchers made use of long term debt. Average outstanding debt was computed 
for each firm thus: 
i = n=10 
    it 
  t=1         4.1 
         n      
Average market value of net assets was computed for each firm thus: 
    n  
   NAi  =    NAit      4.2  
      t=1     
     n 
These computations are consistent with  Realdon (2006) 
Given the results in Table 4.4 and the fact that the corporate tax rate equals 30 
percent for the study period (1996 – 2005), we derive the tax benefits of debt (TD) 
as follows: 
TD = τcB        4.3 
 = 30% x N1,186,668,259 
 = N356,000,477.7 
In absolute terms, the tax benefits of debt for the sample firms are over Three 
Hundred and Fifty Six Billion Naira.  
The percentage of these benefits that is captured in net assets can also be derived: 
PTD = 356000477.7 
   2430910613 
  = 14.6% 
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Given that the values of net assets are equivalent to aggregate market valuation of 
firms; our results reveal that tax benefit of debt approximately equals 15 percent of 
firm value.  
Graham’s (2000) study of US firms indicates that the tax benefit of debt equals 9.7 
percent of firm value. This might suggest that Nigerian companies derive greater 
tax advantages in the use of debt relative to their US counterparts. Paradoxically, 
the regression results presented earlier indicate that the tax rate (ح) is insignificant 
in the borrowing decisions of  
firms. 
4.1. Time-Series Results of the Determinants of Capital Structure  
Table 4.2 below presents the results of our time-series leverage regression on our 
eight (8) regressors.  
 
Table 4.2 a. Results Of Market Leverage Regression Using Time Series Data  
 
Table 4.2b. Results of Book Leverage Regression Using Time Series Data  
 
Source: Computed From Data In Table4.2 (using special package for social 
sciences SPSS computer statistical package 
The results presented in Table 4.2 shows an inverse relationship between leverage 
and marginal tax rate for the years 1996-2005 and statistically significant at ten 
percent (0.10). This result contradicts the notion that firms leverage is an increasing 
function of their respective tax positions. 
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Interco-Relation Matrix Of The Relation Between Market Leverage (Ml) And 
The Eight Regressors 
 
Table above indicates that the explanatory variables are not highly multi-collinear. 
Thus, the regression estimates in Table 4.2a are quite reliable.  
Source: Computed From Pooled OLS Regression Analysis. 
 
Firms with higher collateral   should be able to take on more debt, Ceteris paribus. 
Consistent  with this hypothesis; we find that firms with tax benefits have lower 
ratios of property; plant & equipment to assets and marginally higher ratios of 
intangible assets to total assets, than firms without tax benefits. The marginal tax 
positions of firms do not influence managerial decisions on corporate finance in 
Nigeria. Without adjusting for bankruptcy costs, we report the tax benefit of debt to 
be as high as 14.6 percent of firm value. 
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5. Conclusion 
There is clearly no discussion in capital structure   in corporate finance literature 
without a strong emphasis on the impact of tax. Tax constitutes a potentially 
important consideration in financing a firm. Recorded in literatures are that the 
presence of different kinds of tax creates one of the most important sources of 
imperfection in financial leverage decision. The much acclaimed benefits of debt 
financing rests on the finding that with corporate taxes, interest payment become 
tax deductible as an expense. Firm tend to make strategic changes in leverage in 
response to tax law changes. Governments in different countries use the said tax 
benefits arising from debt financing to moderate investment financing among 
firms.  
The Nigerian Government taxes corporate income, but interest is tax-deductible 
expense. A taxpaying firm that pays an extra naira amount of interest receives a 
partially offsetting “interest tax shield” in the form of lower taxes paid. Financing 
with debt instead of equity increases the total after-tax return to debt and equity 
investors, and should increase firm value. The present value of interest tax shields 
could be a very big number. 
Our result might suggest that the substitution effect, brought about by the existence 
of tax shelter substitutes, is greater than the income effect of increasing debt in 
order to reduce the corporate tax liability. On the basis of our empirical results, the 
tradeoff theory is in immediate trouble on the tax front, because it seems to rule out 
conservative debt ratios by taxpaying firms. If the theory is correct, a value-
maximizing firm should never pass up interest tax shields when the probability of 
financial distress is remotely low. Our results fail to confirm a statistically 
significant positive tax coefficient in the observed debt ratios of Nigerian quoted 
firms. 
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